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PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Abstract. The results of the 2016 US Presidential Election 
showed the inaccuracy of the polls and the unexpected 
victories of the Republican candidate in Michigan, 
Florida and Pennsylvania, thereby allowing Donald 
Trump to carry the electoral vote. By using a standard 
Ordinary Least Squares regression, we designed predic-
tive models for four battleground states and assessed 
their accuracy. The model proposed by Lewis-Beck and 
Tien is used as the foundation for proposing secondary 
models that consider macroeconomic variables. While 
most of these models fail to provide accurate results, the 
models which use macroeconomic variables correctly 
identify the results for Pennsylvania and Ohio.
Keywords: US Presidential Election, battleground states, 
blue-collar states, voting models, OLS regression
Introduction
The year 2016 has largely left voters, pollsters, various social science 
experts and members of the media establishment deeply confused. The 
confusion and sense of misdirection started with the Brexit phenomenon. 
Even though many surveys correctly predicted the country would opt to 
leave, the reasoning and underlying causes have been difficult to identify. 
The vote has created divisions, dividing the country by generation, race and 
making many confused about the exact cause of the vote itself. A pattern 
whereby voters choose self-destructive and radical options, in the hope 
such options will force a Copernican turn on the path taken by policy is on 
the rise. Nowhere is this case more evident than in the 2016 US Presidential 
Election. Many predicted the 2016 election would bring an easy victory 
for the Democratic candidate, Hillary Clinton, given that her Republican 
counterpart, Donald Trump, had been plagued by so many scandals that 
appeared to make the Clinton e-mail intrigue irrelevant. 
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There are several ways to react to what may be perceived as a radical 
change to what appeared to be a politically correct and globalised society. 
Many who have been feeling disenfranchised hit the emergency brakes, in 
the process establishing a new pattern of possibly damaging politics. This 
often repeated hypothesis has not been completely verified. The key theo-
retical argument in support of it is the shift in the traditionally Democratic 
states which accepted the potentially dangerous rhetoric and ideas of the 
Republican nominee.
One could consume much time and energy in naming the many threats 
made by Mr Trump, from his questionable attitude to the press to his even 
more questionable understanding of statements that fail to comply with 
both the US Constitution and numerous relevant international agreements. 
In a world of uncertainty and risk, where ‘post-truth’ and ‘alternative facts’ 
are often mentioned concepts, it is safest to conduct a thorough qualitative 
and quantitative analysis in an attempt to understand this phenomenon.
The fact remains that, like the Brexiteers, Trump correctly identified the 
grievance of the White, mostly blue-collar majority in the battleground states 
of the US Great Lakes Region (Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota and 
Pennsylvania) and Florida, where the anti(Latino)-immigrant views he con-
stantly expressed during the campaign obviously found fertile ground to 
flourish and give him victory. Although Trump did not win in Minnesota, 
the victories in all the other battleground states brought him the victory. 
The Great Lakes Region, which overwhelmingly supported Obama in 2012 
(except for traditionally Republican Indiana), changed its orientation in 2016.
The above-mentioned grievance was oriented to neoliberal, transna-
tional capitalism, and the elites that have created and are supporting it, 
exporting manufacturing jobs from the USA (and ignoring the problems of 
what was once pejoratively called the ‘Rust Belt’ and bringing in low-skilled, 
mostly Latin-American immigrants prepared to work for less. These elites 
were personified in H. Clinton and ‘the Washington swamp’1.
Ever since the 1980s, usually seen as the starting point for predictive mod-
els taking previous voter behaviour patterns into account, both elections and 
parties have become more prone to plutocracy and financial capital(ism) 
and triggered resistance from movements such as “Occupy Wall Street”. 
Even though many blue-collar, middle-class voters cared very little about 
1 “The cowardice of the liberal class meant it lost all credibility, much as Bernie Sanders did when 
he sold his soul to the Clinton campaign. The liberal class proved it would stand and fight for nothing. It 
mouthed words and ideas it did not truly believe. It bears significant responsibility for the phenomena 
that created Trump. It should have had the foresight to abandon the Democratic Party after President 
Bill Clinton passed the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement, to build parties and institutions that 
defended the interests of the working class.” Available at https://faktensucher.wordpress.com/2016/11/14/
its-worse-than-you-think-information-clearing-house-ich/.
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such causes, the message of the Republican candidate Mr Trump and his 
anti-trade stance was one they could understand. It should also be noted that 
this is a highly mixed demographic that is difficult to define (Walley, 2017).
Therefore, the demos’ reaction should represent some kind of backfire. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine any improvements in workers’ rights, 
especially for blue-collar, middle- and low-paid workers, who are exactly 
those who elected Mr Trump to the White House. Manza and Crowley 
(2017) also investigate this claim and believe that this demographic was cru-
cial to his electoral success. 
It seems preposterous that lower middle-class workers would vote for 
a billionaire who has profited from the tax-exemption system and capital-
ism as such. However, one fact that is striking tells a lot about why this hap-
pened. In 2007, when ‘the neoliberal miracle’ was at its peak, the real wages 
of non-supervised workers were lower than in the previous years, and the 
real wages of male workers were at the same level as they were in the 1960s: 
“The only time in the last four decades in which workers at the middle and 
bottom of the wage distribution saw consistent gains in real wages was the 
period of low unemployment in the 1990s boom’’ (Baker, 2016: 28).
Predicting the outcome
Many attempts to predict the results of the election were published. 
Several were actually correct, predicting a slight popular vote victory 
for Secretary Hillary Clinton. The problem is that this simple model only 
accounts for the result of the popular vote. For the fifth time in history and 
the second time in recent history, the winner of the popular vote did not 
win the electoral vote. Unlike the 2000 presidential election when the results 
were contested and a recount effort ultimately stopped by the Supreme 
Court, this time the Clinton campaign conceded within a day of knowing 
the results. The US electoral system distributes votes amongst states based 
on their respective population size. The system means the most populous 
states also have the largest number of electoral votes. 
The outcome is, in general, the crucial votes are those of the so-called 
swing states or battleground states which frequently alternate between vot-
ing for either Democratic or Republican candidates. Some of these swing 
states carry quite a big number of electoral votes and an overwhelming 
share of campaign funds and the candidates’ time are spent campaigning 
in them. One of the most crucial states in recent elections has been Florida. 
With its 29 electoral votes, it is third behind California, which is allocated 
55 electoral votes, and Texas holding 38 electoral votes. Since 1980, Florida 
has voted for the winning candidate in each election, except for the 1992 
election when Bill Clinton defeated George H.W. Bush. In its long history, 
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Florida has mostly favoured Republican candidates. However, this state was 
central to the Democratic coalition constructed by the 44th President of the 
United States, Barack Obama. Usually, when pollsters or anyone discussing 
potential models for how to obtain an electoral victory, the discussion is 
centred on mathematical paths to victory.
When it comes to Congressional elections, the paper by Tonkes and 
Lesmono (2009) is worth mentioning. They state (2009: 46): “Election tim-
ing as an endogenous policy variable in relation with other factors such 
as growth rate, electoral support and other subsequent economic perfor-
mance has also been investigated, mathematically modelled and applied in 
several countries”.2
The changing demographic in many states due to the increase in the num-
ber of African American and Latino-American voters has largely favoured the 
Democratic Party. It also has caused a changing dynamic whereby tradition-
ally strongly Republican states, such as Texas, in a few years could become 
battleground states as well. Johnson, Scala and Smith (2016) emphasise the 
significance of such demographic trends in New Hampshire, with more 
young voters and immigrants identifying themselves as Democrats.
One of the Democratic campaign’s key mistakes was its focus on tra-
ditionally Republican states, starting with the assumption of winning in 
‘assured’ Democratic states. Attempts made to overturn decades of tradition-
ally Republican voting in Arizona and Texas ultimately proved fruitless, all 
the while consuming desperately needed campaign funds, time and energy, 
which should have been allocated to ensuring its message was heard by 
working-class, white voters.3 The Clinton campaign’s last-minute rush of 
celebrities and the political elite to Michigan was insufficient to overturn the 
electoral trend in favour of the Republican candidate. Schmidt (2013: 1699) 
indicated that, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, there was a 
rise in middle-aged white voters identifying themselves as Republican, thus 
already signifying this general trend several years ago. This demographic 
2 “Our quantitative model for the electoral state considers the voting intentions of the public as a sin-
gle state variable governed by a stochastic differential equation. Actual election outcomes are distorted by 
both deterministic and stochastic outcomes” (Tonkes and Lesmono, 2009: 46).
3 Simple surveys that ask people who they expect to win are among the most accurate methods for 
forecasting US presidential elections. The majority of respondents correctly predicted the election winner in 
193 (89 percent) of 217 surveys conducted from 1932 to 2012. Across the last 100 days prior to the seven 
elections from 1988 to 2012, vote expectation surveys provided more accurate forecasts of election winners 
and vote shares than four established methods (vote intention polls, prediction markets, quantitative mod-
els, and expert judgment) (Graefe, 2014: 204).
Vote expectation surveys were most accurate in predicting election winners and vote shares. If one had 
simply relied on the most recent vote expectation survey available on a particular day, one would have achi-
eved an average hit rate of 92 percent. (…) In comparison, if one had relied on the most recent single poll on 
the same day, one would have predicted the correct winner only 79 percent of the time (Graefe, 2014: 219).
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shift was crucial to the Republican candidate’s success, especially in the 
blue-collar states. Thus, it is interesting to note the research of Elinder (2011: 
236) who finds that political attitudes are not significantly influenced by 
prior voting behaviour. This assertion will be further explored in the discus-
sion, while it is relevant to note the level of debate during the 2016 election.
One of the most accurate predictive methods for the US presidential elec-
tions is “Keys to the White House”, a forecasting model that has retrospec-
tively predicted the popular-vote winner of every American presidential 
election from 1860 to 1980, and forecast well ahead of time the popular-vote 
winner of every presidential election from 1984 to 2008 (Lichtman, 2010: 
33). For example, in 2010 Lichtman predicted that out of 13 keys, 9 were true 
(therefore favouring the incumbent), and 4 were false. Consequently, the 
prediction was that the Democratic candidate and the incumbent President 
would win the 2012 Presidential Election, which proved correct. However, 
the problem with the US presidential elections is that they are not decided 
by the popular vote, even though the popular and electoral votes have coin-
cided in the great majority of these elections. Therefore, the prognosis for 
2016 was correct, in terms of the popular vote. There were 5 negative keys 
out of 13 (the fatal number to defeat the incumbent party holding the White 
House is 6)4, and Hillary Clinton did win the popular vote by a huge margin. 
Nevertheless, in the USA the electoral system decides who will be President, 
not voters at the national level.
For the 2012 election, the Continuous 2012 Presidential Election 
Poll (CPEP) introduced an innovative way to forecast the results of the 6 
November 2012, US presidential election. The CPEP’s main innovations 
were that respondents were asked to express their percentage chance of 
voting in the election as well as their percentage chance of voting for each 
candidate, and that the study was conducted within a panel. The use of 
percentage chance questions to elicit voting intentions was pioneered by 
Delavande and Manski (2010), who showed this to be a successful method 
for eliciting respondents’ likely voting behaviour (Gutsche et al., 2014: 234)5.
The 2016 election was deeply impacted by political uncertainty, con-
flict and scandals, resulting in both candidates reaching historic levels of 
unpopularity. Since the Republican primaries, there were rising concerns 
about media coverage of the election. Those concerns focused on two main 
4 Available at https://pollyvote.com/en/components/index-models/keys-to-the-white-house/.
5 The sample for the study consists of members of the RAND American Life Panel (ALP). The ALP is a 
panel of US households that regularly take surveys over the Internet in either English or Spanish (Gutsche 
et al., 2014: 237).
The result received by using the model implies a 93 percent probability of Obama winning the popular 
vote. This corresponds well with the New York Times FiveThirtyEight final prediction, which gave Obama a 
90.9 percent chance of winning (Silver, 2012) (in: Gutsche et al., 2014: 247).
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problems: 1) covering of news which was sensationalistic and attracted more 
viewers; and 2) the problem of ‘fake news’, which was constantly emerging 
during the campaign, that was a frequent method of attack by Mr Trump 
in both his primary campaign and the general election. Many believed the 
questionable attacks by the Republican candidate would prevent him from 
being a serious candidate in the general election, a view largely conform-
ing to the thesis of Snyder and Ting (2011). The question of media ethics, 
i.e. how to cover a candidate, which perceives the truth as undervalued or 
at times even unnecessary was a constant source of debate. McCann and 
Jones-Correa (2016: 1) note the increased level of negative rhetoric, espe-
cially the negative focus on immigration during the Republican primaries. 
Britt (2003) studied self-engagement in the 2000 US presidential election 
and its motivational and emotional consequences. Using the Triangle Model 
of Responsibility, he found that “engagement in voting was highest when 
the guidelines for voting were perceived as clear, when the individual per-
ceived personal control over voting, when the individual perceived voting 
as relevant to his or her role as a citizen, and when who won the election 
was important to the individual”. Klofstad (2016) discusses the relevance of 
voice pitch for election outcomes. 
Ever more factors outside the sphere of traditional politics are influenc-
ing election results. Somewhere during the time of the numerous scandals 
and pseudo scandals, the American public completely lost its appetite for 
a divisive election. Many questions bearing a very strong influence on the 
United States’ near future were not addressed at all. Relevant examples 
include America’s rising public debt, as well as its current inability to lift its 
economic growth above 3%. During the entire campaign, everyone was ask-
ing questions about the candidates’ characters, rather than implementable 
policy plans and strategies. Many ideas suggested by the Republican candi-
date came without any details concerning their application and he has yet 
to provide any details of how his signature policy plans will be carried out. 
This is especially interesting considering the research by Debacker (2015) 
suggesting that in re-elections US senators encounter difficulties if they 
often switch positions or ‘flip-flop’ on relevant issues. Therefore, it is dif-
ficult to understand how the Republican candidate managed to be elected 
without taking clear stances on any relevant issue. Even without even refer-
ring to abstract plans such as building a wall along the Mexican border, to 
be financed by Mexico, there are numerous policy concerns which should 
deeply trouble the American public. Wu (2016) emphasises the absence of 
a strong economic message from the Democrats and Mr Trump’s appeal 
regarding his calls to limit free trade.
The Republicans constantly argued it was necessary to replace the 
Affordable Health Care Act, popularly known as ‘Obamacare’, but have 
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since been unable to come up with a plausible replacement for it. Following 
the election, in 2017 the Republican Party has control over the Senate, the 
Congress, and the White House. It has a clear mandate to govern and, unlike 
the economic legacy left to Barack Obama by George W. Bush, it has rela-
tively favourable economic conditions to start a new era. For the past eight 
years, the Republican Party has mostly been satisfied being an often uncon-
structive opposition to President Barack Obama. They took unprecedented 
steps by refusing to even consider Obama’s candidate for the Supreme 
Court, Merrick Brian Garland, and therefore made unusual steps to limit the 
power of the executive branch and to find excuse after excuse to delegiti-
mise the sitting President of the United States. In 2017, the post-election fail-
ure to pass an alternative healthcare plan, due to opposition from within, 
seems to fuel the Republican Party’s position as if it is still today the party in 
opposition, which is unrealistic
While all of these elements might appear irrelevant or slightly uncon-
nected, they were all necessary to pave the path for an unconventional can-
didate like Mr Trump. The immigrant crisis, the failure of US foreign policy 
in the Middle East, mostly connected with the Obama Presidency (albeit he 
inherited Bush’s failures), and the terrorist attacks all contributed to make 
Trump a relevant candidate, and cannot be properly evaluated by models 
that only measure macroeconomic trends.
The gridlock in the Congress during President Obama’s period of office 
caused an intense public backlash to the slow pace of politics. The divisive-
ness and constant challenging of the President’s authority set the scene 
for one of the most scandal-plagued elections in modern American his-
tory. Many pollsters detected trends of falling support for Hillary Clinton 
in the aftermath of the potential new FBI investigation. Comey, the former 
director of the FBI, sent two days prior to the election, may even have had 
a negative impact on Clinton by reinforcing the image of a system working 
for the ‘Washington elite’. This also conforms to Celuba’s (2005) thesis that 
decreased voter turnout follows when the public feels a lack of respect for 
the government and the process. The constant scandals and low level of 
political discourse depressed the voter turnout, while the FBI scandals ener-
gised voters for the Republican candidate. Some of the general concerns 
noted in this section are highly relevant for developing the theses presented 
in the methodology section.
Methodology
Concerning the general model for projecting election results, Lewis-Beck 
and Tien (2016) conducted their prediction using the following equation:
Presidential vote = Political popularity + Economic Growth (1)
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Using these two very simple variables and an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression, one is likely to obtain a rough assessment of the winner of 
the popular vote. The problem is, as mentioned, that the winner of the pop-
ular vote is not necessarily the winner of the electoral vote. George W. Bush 
and Donald J. Trump both lost the popular vote, yet won the electoral vote. 
This paper considers use of the same equation but, on the country level, it 
analyses specific battleground states. For the first model, the dependent var-
iable is the percentage of the vote received by the Republican presidential 
candidate during 1988–2016. The data for that variable is extracted from the 
official website of the National Archive and Records Administration (2017). 
The independent variables are the four-year average of the state’s economic 
growth measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the political pop-
ularity of the candidate (RPA), measured by his popularity in the Gallup poll 
surveying likely voters (Gallup, 2017). The data on a state’s economic growth 
were extracted from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2017). The second 
model follows the general explorations of different models by Lewis-Beck 
and Tien (2016), using macroeconomic data as independent variables. The 
general model can be described as follows:
Presidential vote = Economic Growth + log(Stock Index)  
+ Unemployment Rate (2)
Similar to the first model, the dependent variable is the percentage of 
votes received by the Republican presidential candidate in the observed 
time period. The only significant difference included is that, rather than 
depending upon polling, this model depends on the predictive value of rele-
vant macroeconomic indicators. Economic growth is measured through the 
GDP percentage growth of the state observed, with the data coming from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2017). The data for the Dow Jones Index 
measure the value of the stock index on Election Day, prior to polls opening 
in the majority of the United States (Dow Jones Stock Indices, 2017). This 
presents a relevant short-term indicator, although this index often decreases 
in value prior to the election due to the relatively high level of political 
uncertainty. The value of this Dow Jones Index is transferred into the form 
of its natural logarithm to avoid potential errors regarding statistical inaccu-
racy. The data concerning the unemployment rate also measures unemploy-
ment levels at state level for the quarter the elections took place, with the 
data extracted from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017).
There are several reasons this paper focuses on individual (battle-
ground) states rather than on the country as a whole. The key one is that 
the electoral map and the way the electoral college functions make it more 
likely for the popular vote winner to still be unable to win the electoral col-
lege. This approach also has its shortcomings since we are unable to predict 
the winner of the overall elections, but only observe a sample of several 
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battleground states. This paper seeks to observe trends and patterns within 
these battleground states in the hope of providing a more significant over-
all conclusion. There is an obvious downside to such an approach, namely 
the availability and suitability of the data is far lower at the level of the bat-
tleground states. It should be noted, as evidenced by the work of several 
authors such as Lewis-Beck and Tien (2016), that many scholars have gener-
ally produced valid and correct results. Hillary Clinton did win the popular 
vote, yet these predictions are irrelevant because what is important is that 
the candidate hat receives a majority of votes of the Electoral College rather 
than of the electorate itself. Several aspects that impacted the 2016 election, 
such as the influence of alleged Russian hacking, or the letter sent by James 
Comey, simply cannot be quantified. 
The analysis was conducted in the Gnu Regression, Econometrics and 
Time-series Library (GRETLE). Prior to conducting the empirical analysis, 
the theoretical discussion and analysis of existing literature enabled the con-
struction of the following theoretical hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Due to the inaccuracy of polling on Election Day, the first 
set of models will have limited success in predicting the outcome of the 
2016 election.
Null hypothesis: The effects of polling data will have no impact on pre-
dicting the results of the 2016 election.
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant structural break in the voting patterns 
in the 2016 election in Michigan and Pennsylvania.
Null hypothesis: There is no noticeable difference in the voting patterns 
before and after the 2016 election in Michigan and Pennsylvania.
Hypothesis 3: The models which include political popularity will have 
greater success in predicting the election outcome than those that predict 
the election outcome based only on macroeconomic variables.
Null hypothesis: There is no statistically significant difference between 
the two models utilised to predict the election outcome.
Results and discussion
By inputting the values into the standard OLS regression, we are pro-
vided with the following equations. For Michigan, the equation is as follows:
Votes = 3.576(0.595) – 0.026(9525) * GDP + 0.887 (0.0013) * RPA (3)
It is important to note that the model is statistically significant at the 
5% significance level, yet the coefficient determining the relevance of eco-
nomic growth is statistically insignificant, as is the constant. The values 
in the parentheses are the respected P-values of the coefficients. With an 
R-squared of 0.89, the predictive value of the model is satisfactory. An alter-
native to increasing the model’s predictive value would be to include other 
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elements, possibly the Dow Jones Index, to allow us to better understand 
the short-run relationship. It is clear that the four-year moving averages, at 
least in the case of Michigan, fail to predict any statistically significant trend. 
When viewing the model dependency, the following is observed in Table 1.
Table 1: ACTUAL AND FITTED VALUES FOR MICHIGAN
Year Actual value Fit value Prediction
2016 47.50 44.33 False
2012 44.70 47.91 Correct
2008 40.96 40.87 Correct
2004 47.81 47.02 Correct
2000 46.15 46.06 Correct
1996 38.48 39.82 Correct
1992 36.38 36.37 Correct
1988 53.57 53.17 Correct
Source: Authors’ calculations and GRETLE output.
Similarly to its R-squared value, the model predicts the correct result 
87.5% of the time for the elections. The only election it failed to predict 
was the shocking win of Donald J. Trump, which is probably due to a struc-
tural break appearing in voting patterns within Michigan. The equation for 
Pennsylvania is as follows:
Votes = 11.243(0.179) – 0.177(0.843) * GDP + 0.743(0.0054) * RPA (4)
The factor of concern is that, once again, the coefficients for both the 
constant and economic growth are not relevant at any level of statistical rel-
evance. While the model has a tolerable predictive value, most of the mod-
el’s potency seems to derive from the consistency of polling. As in Michigan, 
this will likely mean that the fitted values failed to, and cannot predict, the 
outcome of the 2016 election.
Table 2: ACTUAL AND FITTED VALUES FOR PENNSYLVANIA
Year Actual value Fit value Prediction
2016 48.6 45.06 False
2012 46.6 48.29 Correct
2008 44.17 42.17 Correct
2004 48.42 47.35 Correct
2000 46.43 46.20 Correct
1996 39.97 41.17 Correct
1992 36.13 38.47 Correct
1988 50.7 52.30 Correct
Source: Authors’ calculations and GRETLE output.
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The model has an accuracy of 87.5% in predicting the actual outcome, 
with its obvious weakness being its failure to predict the 2016 election 
result. The equation for Florida is as follows:
Votes = 5.067(0.5418) – 0.216(0.662) * GDP + 0.936(0.0026) * RPA (5)
The result reflects the same patterns as the results for Pennsylvania and 
Michigan. While the candidate’s political popularity is a significant variable, 
none of the other selected variables seems to be statistically significant. Yet 
this does not detract from the moderately high R-squared of the model, with 
the value being 0.87 and the model itself being relevant even at the 1% sig-
nificance level. The results for the elections themselves are presented in 
Table 3.
Table 3: ACTUAL AND FITTED VALUES FOR FLORIDA
Year Actual value Fit value Prediction
2016 49 45.06 False
2012 49.1 48.29 Correct
2008 48.22 42.17 Correct
2004 52.1 47.35 False
2000 48.85 46.20 False
1996 42.32 41.17 Correct
1992 40.89 38.47 Correct
1988 60.87 52.30 Correct
Source: Authors’ calculations and GRETLE output.
Despite having a higher R-squared value, the model predicts the correct 
winner in 62.5% of actual elections. However, it failed to predict both vic-
tories by George W. Bush and the results of the 2016 election. There are 
several probable causes. The first is the considerable discrepancy between 
the candidate’s popularity and ultimate election result. As the model largely 
depends on the polls, the outcome seems difficult to distinguish and future 
research should include other variables, perhaps capturing short-term eco-
nomic trends, as well as variables for understanding the political stability at 
the time. A significant problem is the lacking number of long-term variables 
to account for the political stability of the United States. The equation for 
Ohio is as follows:
Votes = 9.749(0.299) – 0.432(0.5303) * GDP + 0.842(0.0058) * RPA (6)
The model equation is consistent with the results for the other observed 
states. The model’s R-squared is a moderate 0.81. While significant at the 5% 
confidence level, the model’s predictive value once again depends almost 
exclusively on the candidate’s respective polling. Table 4 shows the differ-
ence between the fit values and the actual incomes of presidential elections.
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Table 4: ACTUAL AND FITTED VALUES FOR OHIO
Year Actual value Fit value Prediction
2016 51.7 47.71 Correct
2012 47.7 51.47 False
2008 46.91 45.27 Correct
2004 50.81 50.48 Correct
2000 49.97 48.35 Correct
1996 41.02 41.17 Correct
1992 38.35 38.47 Correct
1988 55 52.30 Correct
Source: Authors’ calculations and GRETLE output.
Despite having the lowest R-squared value of the first four models, the 
results are correctly predicted for 87.5% of the observed elections. The 
model only incorrectly gives Governor Mitt Romney an electoral victory in 
Ohio in 2012. The result for 2016 does not fully provide the correct results, as 
it would only hand the Republican candidate victory because Hillary Clinton 
won just 43% of the vote. Future efforts should rely on not only short-term 
indexes, but also other variables that are central to modern-day elections 
to determine whether they have any statistical significance. Including ele-
ments such as the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality may help to 
boost the predictive value of the observed models. This largely conforms to 
the conclusions of Autor et al. (2017) who stated that the increase in Chinese 
imports to the USA added to the Republican Party’s growing popularity. 
Since it seems that traditional political models fail to indicate the correct 
electoral outcome, the second model which includes macroeconomic vari-
ables is considered.
The first of these models concerns Michigan, with the following equation:
Votes = 42.92(0.3856) – 0.241(0.8922) * Unemployment + 0.288(0.8163)  
* GDP + 0.31(0.945) * log(Dow Jones Index) (7)
The problem with this model is that its R-squared value is around 0.04, 
meaning that its predictive value is close to being statistically insignificant. 
None of the three selected independent variables, or the constant, are statis-
tically significant even at the 10% level of statistical significance.
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Table 5:  ACTUAL AND FITTED VALUES FOR MICHIGAN USING 
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES
Year Actual value Fit value Prediction
2016 47.50 45.91 False
2012 44.70 44.18 Correct
2008 40.96 42.05 Correct
2004 47.81 43.9 Correct
2000 46.15 45.13 Correct
1996 38.48 45.24 Correct
1992 36.38 44.45 False
1988 53.57 44.68 False
Source: Authors’ calculations and GRETLE output.
Despite its very low predictive value, the model, which depends on mac-
roeconomic values, is more precise in predicting the outcome of the 2016 
election. It does not correctly predict the election of George H.W. Bush in 
1988 and, because Bill Clinton won the vote with 43.8% of the vote, it is also 
inaccurate. The equation for Pennsylvania is as follows:
Votes = 8.359(0.7757) – 1.075(0.4723) * Unemployment + 3.057(0.1841)  
* GDP + 3.93(0.1884) * log(Dow Jones Index) (8)
None of the selected independent variables are individually significant, 
but the overall R-squared is not as low as with the model with macroeco-
nomic independent variables concerning Michigan. The predicted values 
for Pennsylvania are displayed in Table 6 and these are so far the only 
model to correctly predict the results of the 2016 election, aside from the 
Ohio model.
Table 6: ACTUAL AND FITTED VALUES FOR PENNSYLVANIA
Year Actual value Fit value Prediction
2016 48.6 51.10 Correct
2012 46.6 44.57 Correct
2008 44.17 40.76 Correct
2004 48.42 46.22 Correct
2000 46.43 46.72 Correct
1996 39.97 44.63 Correct
1992 36.13 39.53 Correct
1988 50.7 47.49 False
Source: Authors’ calculations and GRETLE output.
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While the margin of the victory is off by more than 2%, this model cor-
rectly predicts that Donald J. Trump will be elected as President. The model 
generally has a very high rate of predicting the correct outcome, with the 
model’s only failure being its failure to predict George H. W. Bush’s narrow 
victory over Michael Dukakis in 1988. The equation for Florida is as follows:
Votes = 87.06(0.1316) – 2.062(0.4404) * Unemployment + 0.719(0.6544) * 
GDP – 2.812(0.5381) * log(Dow Jones Index) (9)
The relatively low R-squared value indicates the low predictive value 
of the model. Controversially, Florida has for several elections been a bat-
tleground state where comparatively small margins have decided the out-
come. This further inhibits accurate forecasting for this state. Once again, 
not all three of the coefficients is individually significant at the 10% signifi-
cance level. The fitted and actual values are presented in Table 7.
Table 7: ACTUAL AND FITTED VALUES FOR FLORIDA
Year Actual value Fit value Prediction
2016 49 46.79 False
2012 49.1 44.39 Correct
2008 48.22 48.37 Correct
2004 52.1 50.78 Correct
2000 48.85 51.48 Correct
1996 42.32 50.19 False
1992 40.89 47.08 Correct
1988 60.87 52.28 Correct
Source: Authors’ calculations and GRETLE output.
Like in many of the previous models, the results for the 2016 election 
are not correctly identified. There is a second error concerning previous 
elections, where the 1996 election is awarded to Bob Dole rather than Bill 
Clinton. Aside from these two elections, the results are relatively satisfactory 
for a model with such a low R-squared value. The discrepancies between the 
actual and fitted results are far greater than in the model which depended 
on the political popularity of the Republican candidate. The final equation 
for Ohio is as follows:
Votes = 52.51(0.2859) – 1.491(0.5203) * Unemployment – 0.4927755 * 
GDP + 0.5865(0.8884) * log(Dow Jones Index) (10)
The results for Ohio are as discouraging as those for Michigan, with a 
highly low R-squared value and all three variables, as well as the constant, 
being statistically insignificant at the 10% significance level. Table 8 displays 
the model’s accuracy and allows us to understand some of its shortcomings.
.
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Table 8: ACTUAL AND FITTED VALUES FOR OHIO
Year Actual value Fit value Prediction
2016 51.7 48.94 Correct
2012 47.7 46.35 Correct
2008 46.91 47.32 Correct
2004 50.81 47.39 False
2000 49.97 51.51 Correct
1996 41.02 48.68 False
1992 38.35 44.45 False
1988 55 46.83 Correct
Source: Authors’ calculations and GRETLE output.
The model again correctly predicts the result for 2016, but does not pre-
dict the Republican candidate’s success will exceed 50%. There are also dis-
crepancies between the fitted values and actual results, as well as the result 
for 1988 where the model is only correct due to the very low result achieved 
by Dukakis. Overall, the predictive values of the models based on political 
popularity provide far more reliable results than those that depend on mac-
roeconomic indicators. Based on the results of the predictive models, it is 
possible to discuss the previously established theoretical hypotheses. It is 
largely possible to confirm the first hypothesis, which established that the 
models based on political popularity would have limited success in predict-
ing the outcome of the 2016 election.
Despite the fact the model provided the correct result for Ohio for the 
2016 election, the hypothesis is correct for the remaining three models. The 
second hypothesis established there might be a structural break in voting 
patterns in Michigan and Pennsylvania. The results of the models seem to 
principally conform to this hypothesis and the Democratic Party’s failure to 
appeal to white working-class workers seems to have led to the acceptance 
of the Republican candidate’s anti-establishment rhetoric. The results of the 
models seem to strongly support the acceptance of the third hypothesis 
because the models that depend on macroeconomic variables seem to have 
large discrepancies with the actual results in predicting the elections in the 
period 1988–1996, although they are slightly more accurate in predicting 
the 2016 election outcome.
While these empirical results somewhat conform to the findings of 
Lewis-Beck and Tien (2016), it is interesting to once again consider the find-
ings of Elinder (2011). There is clearly no substantive evidence that cogni-
tive dissonance theory, as defined by Elinder (2011), provides a consistent 
base for any political party in the United States. While many states have con-
sistently voted for either the Republican or the Democratic Party, the very 
existence of ‘battleground states’ to some extent reduces the value of the 
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cognitive dissonance theory arguments. The key theoretical argument that 
can be made is that there has been a clear shift in the development of US 
presidential elections. As stressed by Snyder and Ting (2011), there used to 
be a negative outcome of statements made during the primaries that would 
have an adverse impact on the general election. This hypothesis clearly did 
not apply to Mr Trump who managed to be elected despite holding highly 
radical stances during the primaries. 
It is interesting to take note of this fact with regard to Public Choice 
Theory. Ciraki (1996: 201) emphasises that the goal of democracy and the 
political process is for individuals to make decisions based on the wishes 
of the majority of the electorate. In a highly unconventional way, this is 
how the Republican candidate approached the 2016 election. He repeated 
messages that won applause at rallies, encouraging the “Drain the swamp” 
and “Lock her up” chants that energised his base.6 He articulated these 
stances because he believed they would encourage the turnout of his target 
demographic, while the tone and conduct of the election discouraged the 
Democratic base from even participating. Donald Trump’s electoral success 
is understandable from the viewpoint of Public Choice Theory, as Ciraki 
(1996) stresses that every individual has both political and economic inter-
ests. The Republican candidate managed to appeal to the economic interests 
of the corporate elite and wealthy white voters, together with the disenfran-
chised middle-class and their forgotten political views – such as a regulation 
that would allow more coal-mining jobs. This unlikely coalition ultimately 
carried the day with many far-reaching consequences. As emphasised by 
Fukuyama (2016), this demonstrates that inequality may be the strongest 
motive for voters. Regardless of the Trump Administration’s results, this pro-
vides a clear message to both parties that they need to make greater efforts 
to create more inclusive social policies. 
Conclusion
The paper discusses the results of the 2016 US election and finds that 
the equation proposed by Lewis-Beck and Tien (2016) provides results that 
are not entirely successful in determining the outcomes of the election in 
Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Florida. While most equations based on 
political popularity considered in this paper have more than acceptable pre-
dictive values, further research should be conducted to establish which fac-
tors have influenced the current state of US politics. Possibly, the most sig-
nificant variable which should be replaced by one or more other variables 
6 Some of his approaches to the political discourse have even drawn comparison with Hitler, for fur-
ther discussion see Connolly (2017). 
Filip KOKOTOVIC, Petar KURECIC
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 54, 5/2017
763
is the problematic variable of measuring a candidate’s political probability. 
As many pollsters clearly failed to use a representative sample, the incorrect 
polling values strongly affect all of the observed models.
The second set of equations correctly predicts the results of the 2016 
election in two of the four observed states, but their general predictive value 
is far lower and the results for Ohio and Michigan are highly unfavourable. 
It seems difficult to achieve a higher predictive value of the model with-
out incorporating the political popularity of candidates, although this cre-
ates a causal link in which the inaccuracy of polling makes any short-term 
predictions inaccurate. The 2016 election provided an unexpected over-
turn in Democratic-leaning states, such as Michigan and Pennsylvania, and 
it remains to be seen whether the Democratic Party can reshape its mes-
sage so that it more strongly appeals to working, white, middle-class voters. 
Despite the changing electoral landscape in some Republican-leaning states 
such as Arizona and Texas, the Democratic Party cannot hope to alter the 
outcome of future elections significantly without maintaining a key grasp 
over the demographic groups that were central to the victories of President 
Obama in 2008 and 2012.
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